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The ‘highly competitive social market economy’ represents
the targeted common economic order of the European Un-
ion as it is stated as a goal in the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, this en-
deavor requires a mutual understanding of which institu-
tions constitute a modern social market economy. The re-
sults of the Index of Modern Social Market Economies
(IMSME) show congruence around a liberal market econo-
my, but great diversity in principles indispensible for a social
market economy.
Focus
The IMSME concept builds upon
Walter Eucken’s constitutive and
regulating principles for a
competitive market economy,
modernizes them according to the
challenges and societal expectations
of today and defines them in such a
way that allows for functional
equivalencies in other countries.
Source: See Bertelsmann Stiftung 2012 for a
description of the underlying concept and a
complete list of indicators.
© Bertelsmann Stiftung
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concept for the institutional definition of
the structures and principles that consti-
tute this economic order (see Bertelsmann
Stiftung 2012). This approach avoids the
multicorrelation pitfalls of outcome-
oriented indices and offers a foundation
for further discussion among member
states in regard to the more concrete insti-
tutions needed to truly arrive at a highly
competitive social market economy. The
IMSME study fills a data gap in several
institutional areas of the MSME and elabo-
rates on the way in which institutional
frameworks interact with each other, ei-
ther buttressing strengths or exacerbating
weaknesses. Due to the importance of the
interdependence of the principles, high
scores in all of the principles are neces-
sary to truly be considered an MSME.
While the index project aimed primarily to
create and empirically test the robustness
of a concept for measuring the institutions
of a modern social market economy, the
key findings of this explorative study offer
insights into advantages and disadvan-
tages of the de facto economic and social
orders of each country. As such, it serves
as a starting point for discussions guiding
institutional reforms toward a modern so-
cial market economy in the member states
and at the aggregate European level.
Measurable indicators for each principle
make this analysis concrete and translat-
able into policy measures commensurate
with an MSME.
The European Social Mar-
ket Economy in Focus
Heterogeneity in economic outcomes and
policies among the European Union mem-
ber states is to be expected considering
the divergent starting points and compara-
tive advantages of each economy. For this
reason, the IMSME defined the institu-
tions of the MSME according to underly-
ing principles that should form a common
denominator and jointly agreed-upon di-
rection for common European policies.
The great deal of variance found in the
explorative study among the evaluated
countries of the EU and EMU raises im-
portant questions about the degree of ne-
cessary versus actual policy and institu-
tional coordination around jointly agreed-
upon institutions. Moreover, it becomes
apparent that the institutional conver-
gence achieved thus far has primarily oc-
curred through liberalization, by decreas-
ing barriers in the areas of the four free-
doms: free movement of people, goods,
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country scores in the principles of open
markets, property rights and freedom of
contract in Figure 3 below. Convergence
in these principles alone indicates that the
EU is moving toward a liberal market
economy model rather than a social mar-
ket economy.
The results of the explorative study sup-
port the claim by Fritz Scharpf and others
that the current governance structures in
the EU political economy achieve dispro-
portionate success in negative integration
(meaning the reduction of barriers), but
lack mechanisms for positive integration
in salient areas. The European Court of
Justice has interpreted a treaty mandate to
enforce negative, or liberalizing integra-
tion directly through its rulings. Moreover,
rulings such as Van Gend & Loos (C-
26/62, 5.2.1963), which defined the treaty
rights not only as rights of the state, but of
individual EU citizens as well, also set the
stage for further, decentralized enforce-
ment through private individuals and legal
entities. (Höpner 2011; Scharpf 2009). In
contrast, positive integration (meaning
harmonization and coordination of in-
struments) in salient policy fields is cur-
rently driven largely by the open method
of coordination (OMC), which has not been
able to achieve the coordination of com-
mon European policies with equal success
as negative integration instruments have
been able to liberalize policies (see for ex-
ample Goulard and Bailey 2010 for an
analysis of the weaknesses of the OMC).
Moving forward in this area in order to
achieve a balanced social market economy
requires agreement on more specific poli-
cies and instruments.
After briefly outlining areas of structural
commonalities among countries in some
of the principles of an MSME, this policy
brief will focus predominantly on deficits
in the remaining areas of institutional di-
versity that are central to balancing the
MSME.
Congruity
Among the 6 EU countries evaluated,
scores for the principles of open markets,
property rights, competition and freedom
of contract are relatively high and do not
exhibit a great deal of variance, which is
reflected in the clustering of scores in Fig-
ure 3 below. These areas best represent
congruity in the four freedoms laid out in
the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union. Differences among EU coun-
tries in terms of property rights and free-
dom of contract are particularly minimal.
Despite relative congruence, some differ-
ences in the principles of open markets
and competition warrant mention. In the
assessment of the institutions guarantee-
ing open markets, for instance, all factor
markets (goods and services, capital and
labor) were considered and scores ranged
between 7.23 to 8.79 – all above average.
However, while the highest-ranking coun-
try for this principle, Sweden, has very
open labor, capital and product markets,
France protects its domestic markets to a
higher degree than other countries in the
sample do and represents the only country
in the sample with higher product market
regulations than the OECD average, in
particular with regard to protection of na-
tional champions.
In modernizing the principle of open mar-
kets for the realities of today, open labor
markets in the form of freedom of migra-
tion prove essential for an MSME. Al-
though Germany scored high in the index
overall, it received the lowest score (6) in
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policies toward labor immigration and in-
tegration. It is one of the only countries
that has thus far failed to design immigra-
tion laws driven by its own economic in-
terests and provides few provisions to fos-
ter the immigration and integration of
highly skilled workers. In contrast, Swe-
den stands out with its transparent immi-
gration system for targeted qualified eco-
nomic immigration, separate from its asy-
lum policies driven by humanitarian in-
tentions. As an integral component of
open labor migration, Sweden’s policies
support and require the integration of la-
bor immigrants.
Germany and the United Kingdom re-
ceived very positive evaluations for their
institutions promoting competition. A
strong competition oversight authority
serves as a pivotal institution for fostering
competition within an economy. The UK
received the highest possible assessment
in this regard and France and Germany
score high as well. Germany’s laws and
rules for competitive structures in the me-
dia stand out as fostering structural diver-
sity, which enables public access to a va-
riety of substantive debate and informa-
tion. By contrast, France and the UK lost
points in the rating for their oligopolistic-
media structures in the printed press and
television, which have the potential to lim-
it access to the object information that
functioning competition requires.
Variance
Variance among countries remains the
most striking for the principles of consis-
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and effective price system.
Consistency of Policy
Consistency of economic policy measures
the degree to which economic policies of
today can be expected to endure in the
long run. Such confidence requires
investment in skills and knowledge for the
future, including human capital. Sweden,
the highest scoring country overall,
invests the greatest percent of its GDP in
research and development while Spain,
the lowest scoring country, invests the
least. Furthermore, important policy
differences between EU and even EMU
countries relate to the control of financial
consolidation and linking pension systems
with life expectancy. Germany is the only
country of the eight evaluated that has
established a debt brake in its
constitution. Also, while six of the eight
have reformed their pension systems to
integrate a link between financing and
demographic change, the Netherlands and
Spain have not. Such reforms are
paramount to sustainable public finance
and thus consistency of policy.
Effective Price System
An effective price system is characterized
by a lack of market-distorting subsidies
and price controls. In practice, all of the
countries evaluated employ price controls
to some extent, some of which can be jus-
tified by market failure. Every country
subsidizes some types of economic activi-
ties. Nevertheless, significant differences
can be seen between countries that re-
ceived relatively high scores such as the
UK and those which scored poorly across
all three indicators for this principle.
France and Spain registered the most
wide-spread price controls among the
sample, as measured by data from the
Fraser Institute. However, France boosted
its overall evaluation by maintaining a rel-
atively low level of subsidies and transfer
payments. Germany, Spain and the Neth-
erlands lost points for comparatively high
levels of price-distorting subsidies.
Liability
Due to a lack of pre-existing data for the
measurement of liability, qualitative indi-
cators were created to measure the quality
of institutions that promote liability in
conjunction with property rights: private
insolvency rules, the extent of incentives
to encourage a long-term profit orientation
among managers and the ratio as well as
promotion of medium-sized companies to
total companies. Sweden led the ranking
for this principle, with Germany closely
behind.
With respect to private insolvency rules,
expert evaluators considered aspects such
as debt servicing periods and mechanisms
for debt collection, as both affect the bor-
rowing and risk-taking behavior of indi-
viduals. While an EU directive from 2000
allows EU citizens to register private in-
solvency wherever they reside in the EU,
EU countries do not coordinate their pri-
vate insolvency rules, which leads to en-
forcement problems in member states
with stricter debt servicing laws. Shorter
periods in the UK, for example, induce
many insolvent German residents to move
to avoid the consequences of bankruptcy,
which include living at a subsistence level
for a period of 6 years while paying any
additional income to the creditor (compare
Fichtner 2010). In Spain, a lack of debt
collection mechanisms may have had ad-
verse effects on the construction boom, as
mortgages became the only way to enforce
collection (see Spain country report).
Medium-sized enterprises often link man-
agement closely to ownership, which
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/03
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/03
06
Fu
tu
re 
So
cia
l M
ark
et 
Ec
on
om
yP
oli
cy 
Br
ief
 # 
20
13
/03 tends to go hand in hand with liability.Germany received the highest marks for
its long tradition of promoting a strong
Mittelstand through various mutually rein-
forcing institutions. Slow SME develop-
ment in France, on the other hand, despite
well-targeted policies in this area, demon-
strates the necessity of a long-term hori-
zon and consistency of policy to success-
fully implement new institutions. Spain
received one of its highest scores in this
area, owed to its rather successful decen-
tralization of policies to promote SMEs.
In a more direct measurement of manager
liability, Swedish law has an array of pro-
visions that earned the country the high-
est ranking for institutions that encourage
responsible management, holding individ-
uals accountable for their actions. Across
the EU, incentives to promote long-term
rather than short-term profit orientation
varied significantly, with the UK and
Netherlands scoring only higher than the
United States, which stood out among the
sample as an economy that focuses heavi-
ly on short-term profit orientation, has the
least amount of mechanisms for manager
liability and reinforces this orientation
through institutions in other areas related
to manager liability. A lack of employer-
employee parity serves as a related exam-
ple – absent workers council rights (or
other forms of decentralized institutions
that foster employee-employer parity), the
US does not benefit from the increased
managerial transparency that often ac-
companies such councils.
Efficient Environmental Protection
None of the countries in the sample ob-
tained an optimal score for market in-
struments that effectively internalize ex-
ternalities. Sweden received a good score
due to an array of taxes that raise the
price of certain goods closer to their actual
cost. The country also invests revenue
from green taxes like the congestion tax in
Stockholm to finance improvements in
public transportation and infrastructure.
While Germany levies an energy tax, it
channels revenue to finance the social se-
curity system rather than focusing on re-
investment in environmentally-friendly
infrastructure. As such, the internalization
effect of green taxes in Germany is lim-
ited. Despite common rules for environ-
mental policy among EU countries, com-
pliance and enforcement differ. Germany
and Spain subsidize pollution-intensive
industries to a larger extent than others
and gas taxes greatly diverge within the
same EU framework.
Effective Labor Markets
A framework for effective labor markets
provides the foundation for active partici-
pation in social life, both during working
years and later in retirement. Spain scored
very low on this principle. The country re-
port describes how the weakness or dys-
function of some institutions actually rein-
forces poor performance in other areas as
well. Sweden and the Netherlands score
consistently high for their institutions fos-
tering an effective labor market. Ger-
many’s active labor market policies
(ALMPs) achieve the best rating for the
country’s success in activating the long-
term unemployed and making financing
decisions based on cost-effectiveness
analysis. However, despite Germany’s
current economic performance, the struc-
tural analysis that serves as the basis of
this assessment reveals weaknesses in the
form of asymmetries that foster a dual la-
bor market. While Germany does not pro-
tect the core of its labor market to quite
the extent that Spain does, the recent
Hartz reforms did further labor market
dualism by focusing liberalization in the
low-wage sector. Therefore, in times of re-
cession, this structural weakness in Ger-
many could become more prominent.
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within this principle among EU member
states. Alongside Spain, the UK and
France also receive very low scores. Spain
and France share very high employment
protection and dual labor market struc-
tures in particular between job market en-
trants and older, established workers as
well as between the large and protected
public sector versus the private sector,
which decreased the score for effective la-
bor markets in these two economies. Fix-
ing the insider-outsider dilemma in France
and Spain will prove difficult due to the
lack of a functioning social partnership in
both countries. Labor unions have tradi-
tionally fought for protection of incum-
bents, making reforms that concentrate on
liberalizing parallel, outsider labor mar-
kets the easier choice. In contrast, the UK
avoids the dual labor market structures of
Spain and France, but lost points in the
assessment for having levels of employ-
ment protection across the board deemed
too low. Moreover, neither Spain nor the
UK has implemented significant active la-
bor market policies. While France, on the
other hand, invests a significant amount of
public funds into ALMPs, it concentrates
its efforts largely on subsidies for employ-
ers and incentives for requalification and
mobility while maintaining relatively le-
nient benefit qualification rules.
Conclusion
A previous policy brief (Shupe 2012) drew
attention to the weaknesses of the current
governance instrument– the open method
of coordination–for coordination and con-
vergence of some of the most salient pol-
icy areas in the EU. Among these weak-
nesses are the lack of sanctions and its
outcome orientation. This policy brief went
beyond considering differences in eco-
nomic performance to highlight the diver-
gence in the structures and underlying
principles that drive member states’ poli-
cies in particular in areas of financial con-
solidation, effective labor markets, liabil-
ity, efficient environmental protection and
an effective price system. Precisely these
areas are crucial for the fulfillment of a so-
cial market economy.
In order to achieve the integration success
that has occurred in the areas of the four
fundamental freedoms, agreements on the
concrete policies and institutions that con-
stitute a highly competitive social market
economy are needed. Absent further polit-
ical coordination, the common denomina-
tor of the de facto European economic or-
der will remain limited to the liberaliza-
tion of the European common market.
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Policy Brief 2012/07: Sustainability and solidarity –
basic ideas of new financial structures
Federal financial structures which include fiscal equaliza-
tion between the German states remain indispensable
for leveling out significant regional economic differences
and for ensuring sufficient funding for the responsibili-
ties of the public sector across the nation. The necessary
revisions of financial structures beginning in 2020 pro-
vide an opportunity for a substantial overhaul. The ob-
jective is to consolidate in the long term the budgets of
federal, state and municipal governments and to safe-
guard a modern welfare state.
Policy Brief 2013/01: How Germany Benefits from
the Euro in Economic Terms
Germany benefits from the euro in a significant number
of ways. For example, monetary union membership
helps to reduce the cost of international trade, and pro-
vides protection against excessive exchange rate volatil-
ity. This means that even if Germany had to write off a
large percentage of the loans that it has made available
to the heavily indebted states of southern Europe as
part of the various euro rescue measures, the economic
advantages of its membership of the monetary union
would continue to predominate.
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